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       This paper studies financial properties of venture-capital backed start-ups through a continuous-time 
real-options patent-race model.  Numerical analysis shows that patent races, relative to a joint monopoly, 
cause over-investment, value-dissipation, a higher CAPM beta, a higher return volatility and more negative 
return correlation when firms intensively compete.  A firm’s CAPM beta is a complicated non-linear 
function of its position relative to its competitor.  The magnitude of annualized return volatilities of start-
ups can be in excess of 100%.  This high level of return volatility is mainly attributed to technological risks 
and is consistent with empirical findings by Cochrane [2004]. 
 
 
This paper develops a duopoly patent-race model by using a continuous-time real-options 
methodology.  Through the patent-race model, we examine financial properties of start-up firms 
controlled by venture capitalists, like firms creating new software, or firms inventing NANO-
technology or WIFI-technology, or firms innovating new drugs.  With the development of high 
technology, these firms become unarguably important in our new economy.  The venture capital 
investment in United States companies reached about $120 billion in year 2000.  We know 
Creation, Invention, Innovation are essential for these firms to survive and become potentially 
cash cows. But, most of these firms are private and the relevant data are not available until 
recently.1  Thus, we know little about financial properties of these firms, such as what are these 
firms’ investment strategies, how these firms are valued, and what are the characteristics of these 
firms’ risk and return? This paper aims to answer these questions and to develop a model to serve 
as a benchmark or guidance for some future empirical work.   
Start-ups are subject to three primary types of uncertainty during an innovation process. 
A new technology will not generate income until it is completed, so there is market demand 
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uncertainty. A firm is uncertain about its technological ability or whether its new technology 
works, thus there is technological uncertainty. Intellectual property protection, like patents, is 
usually granted only to the first inventor. A firm has to strategically interact with its competitors, 
so there is competitive uncertainty.  We build all the three-dimension uncertainty into this model. 
In this model, two start-ups, controlled by venture capitalists, compete to invent a new technology.  
Each firm chooses an investment rate at which it develops the new technology.  The winner of the 
race is awarded a patent and starting from that point receives a sequence of cash flows, which are 
valued by the Capital Asset Pricing Model.  The loser of the race receives nothing.  Duopoly 
competition for the patent is modeled as a game in which there are three publicly observed state 
variables:  the value of the patent and the expected cost-to-completion of each of the two firms.  
Each of the state variables is governed by its own source of risk.  The value of the patent is the 
present value of the cash flows, which follows geometric Brownian motion subject to both 
systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk.  The overall uncertainty underlying the patent value is 
referred to as “market demand uncertainty,” which gives firms real options to wait for more 
information about the profitability of the patent.  The position of each firm in the race is described 
by a state variable, called the expected “cost-to-completion,” which measures the expected 
amount of money a firm needs to succeed in developing the new technology and winning the 
patent race (the follow-on capital).  Each firm’s expected cost-to-completion follows a diffusion 
process governed by its own idiosyncratic technological risk, which is a special case of the 
technology described by Pindyck [1993].  With a firm’s own idiosyncratic technological 
uncertainty, a firm has an incentive to invest to resolve this uncertainty and learn more about how 
difficult the project is (learning-by-doing).  A firm’s investments can lead to technological 
improvements as well as technological setbacks.  With its competitor’s idiosyncratic 
technological uncertainty, a firm receives either preemptive threats to invest or incentives to 
withhold investments depending on this firm’s position relative to its competitor in the patent race.  
In an environment with multiple sources of uncertainty, a firm has to strike a balance among the 
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real options to wait, the incentives to invest or withhold investments, and the preemptive threats 
to invest. 
 The equilibrium concept is full information Markov Perfect equilibrium.  Each firm 
chooses an investment rate constrained by its money “burn rate” to maximize its firm value given 
the other firm’s investment rate.  Although the model is formulated in continuous-time, we solve 
it by using numerical approximations.  Using the lattice method, we develop a discrete-time 
implementation on a 201 x 61 x 61 grid with 600 monthly decisions, through which we examine 
investment strategy, valuation, CAPM beta, return volatility and return correlation of firms 
evolved in a patent race.2   We report the results for various relative positions of the firms 
throughout the race. 
 For comparison purpose, we use as a benchmark the case of a joint monopoly in which 
the two firms implement a collusive outcome.3  Comparison of financial properties between a 
hypothetical portfolio comprising the two competing firms and the joint monopoly shows that 
patent races, relative to the joint monopoly, cause over-investment, value-dissipation, a higher 
CAPM beta, a higher return volatility and more negative return correlation between the 
competing firms when the firms intensively compete.  In terms of each individual firm evolved in 
the patent race, as intuition suggests, each firm invests more aggressively.  Each firm’s value is 
non-increasing with its own expected cost-to-completion and non-decreasing with its 
competitor’s expected cost-to-completion.  The value of each firm changes dramatically in 
response to moderate changes in either firm’s position in the race.  Each firm’s CAPM beta is a 
complicated non-linear function of its position relative to its competitor.  When a firm is close to 
victory, its beta is close to the underlying patent beta, but it is always greater than the patent beta 
reflecting the real-options value.  As a firm drops back further away from victory but is still 
investing, its percentage exposure to patent-value-risk increases.  As a firm continues dropping 
back and finally stops investing, its value becomes less sensitive to the patent value and more 
sensitive to its competitor’s technological risk which is idiosyncratic.  Another interesting result 
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is that the magnitude of the annualized return volatility of a start-up can be in excess of 100%.  
This level is quite high comparing to the empirical evidence that typical values of the volatility of 
a stock are in the range of 20% to 40% per annum.4  This high level of return volatility for a 
venture-capital backed start-up is largely attributed to technological risks and is consistent with 
recent empirical findings documented by Cochrane [2004].  Cochrane [2004] studies the risk and 
return of venture capital and finds that the arithmetic returns of venture capital, even after 
correction of selection bias, are very volatile, and the annualized standard deviation is about 
100%.  The model also shows that each firm’s return volatility can be decomposed into 
systematic market demand risk and the two firms’ idiosyncratic technological risks.  The 
proportion of each component changes with a firm’s position in the patent race.  When a firm is 
close to victory, its return volatility is mainly caused by market demand risk.  When a firm is 
close to the other firm in the race, the two firms’ idiosyncratic technological risks account for the 
majority of its return volatility.  When a firm is far behind and stops investing, the firm 
essentially stays away from competition unless the other firm experiences setbacks.  The firm’s 
return volatility is mainly caused by its competitor’s idiosyncratic technological risk in this 
situation.  When both firms invest and intensively compete, beta and return volatility of a firm 
increase when this firm suffers setbacks or its competitor makes improvements.  Regarding return 
correlation of the two competing firms, the model implies that the two firms’ returns are perfectly 
correlated by the common factor of patent value when neither firm invests and most negatively 
correlated when both invest.  This implication is confirmed by our numerical analysis.  These 
results implies that a venture capitalist should encourage its portfolio firms to cooperate more and 
include competing firms into its portfolio if the venture capitalist has spent hands-on effort in any 
of these competing firms.   
 In addition, we conduct a comparative-static analysis of parameters of market demand 
volatility, dividend yield, and technological volatility to study how the leader and the follower 
react differently to these key underlying parameters.  The analysis implies that a firm’s position in 
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the patent race relative to that of its competitor is an important control variable when we study 
investment behavior and other financial properties of firms involved in a patent race.  This control 
variable has been ignored in empirical studies.  We provide a discussion of empirical proxy for 
this control variable.   
We believe that the above results would be difficult to capture in a simple two- or three- 
period model, and thus justify the use of numerical approximations to a dynamic game in 
continuous-time.  
Literature Review 
This research is related to several strands of literature.  One is that of the patent race in 
economics.  Technological competition has been investigated first through stationary games 
under uncertainty by Loury [1979], Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1980] and Lee and Wilde [1980], and 
then through dynamic games under uncertainty but without explicit strategic interactions 
pioneered by Reinganum [1981, 1982], or through dynamic games with strategic interactions but 
without uncertainty pioneered by Fudenberg et al. [1983] and Harris and Vickers [1985].  Finally, 
strategic interactions and technological uncertainty are combined within a dynamic structure, as 
in Judd [1985], Grossman and Shapiro [1987], and Harris and Vickers [1987].  Models in this line 
of research all lack market demand uncertainty because the patent value is set as a constant.  A 
real-options methodology has not been applied.  Therefore, the value of the option to delay 
investments embedded in market demand uncertainty has been ignored.  As a result, the 
investment strategies derived in those papers lack the “delay” feature.   
The second stream of the literature is investment under uncertainty using standard real-
options techniques.5  The papers along this line, represented by the work of McDonald and Siegel 
[1986], Pindyck [1988], and Dixit [1989], highlight market demand uncertainty.  Therefore, the 
real-options premium of delaying investments, which has been ignored in the literature on the 
patent race, is the main finding of this category of research.  But those papers have typically 
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ignored strategic interactions between firms.  They regard firms as either monopolists or entities 
in a perfectly competitive market.6 
This paper unifies the above two lines of research combining real-options with strategic 
interactions.  Therefore, this paper is also related to a recently growing literature of option 
exercise games represented by the work of Kulatilaka and Perotti [1998], Grenadier [2003] and 
Weeds [2002].7  Most existing models assume risk-neutrality precluding the analysis of CAPM 
beta and return volatility of firms evolved in competition.  Technological uncertainty has also 
often been ignored.  Childs and Triantis [1999] examine dynamic R&D investment policy and 
valuation for a firm with multiple R&D projects, which can run in parallel or in sequential.  They 
provide a thorough analysis of the interactions across projects.  In our model, both firms are 
assumed to have a single project.  Novy-Marx [2003] investigates the optimal investment 
decisions of heterogeneous firms in a competitive, uncertainty environment and shows that the 
strategic equilibrium real-options premia are significant.  Grenadier [1999] and Lambrecht and 
Perraudin [1999] study option exercise games under incomplete information.  In our model, both 
firms always have complete information. 
Our continuous-time model is also related to parallel works by Miltersen and Schwartz 
[2004] and Garlappi [2004].  Miltersen and Schwartz [2004] provide a welfare analysis of R&D 
spending with competitive effects in an environment with multiple sources of uncertainty.  They 
adapt a more general version of the technology described by Pindyck [1993], including both 
technical shocks and input shocks.  They solve the model with a variation of the Longstaff-
Schwartz method (Longstaff and Schwartz [2001]) and illustrate an example in which firms start 
with a particular position of head-to-head.  In our model, we apply the “brute force” lattice 
method and provide the results for various relative positions of the firms throughout the race.  It 
allows us to analyze the different behavior and financial properties the leader and the follower 
may have.  Garlappi [2004] studies the dynamics of firms’ risk premia in a duopoly patent race 
with the same three sources of uncertainty as in this paper.  He provides analytical solutions to a 
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two-stage game and numerical analysis to a more general five-stage game.  His model is different 
from this model in that his technology is more discrete and does not allow technological setbacks.  
Instead, firms jump over a series of hurdles before winning the patent race.  By introducing 
technological setbacks and allowing a firm to be far away from its competitor, we find that start-
ups’ CAPM beta is a non-linear function of its position in the race.  A firm’s beta can become 
pretty tiny when the firm is far behind of its competitor.  In addition, the hazard rate is 
independent of a firm’s investments in his model.  Kyle and Meng [2004] extend this model by 
allowing firms to have different research bandwidths and by allowing strategic investments and 
acquisitions to occur, subject to transactions costs.  All of the papers use a real-options approach 
to model competition. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section I describes the model set-up.  Section II 
describes the numerical implementation.  Section III discusses the equilibrium investment 
strategy, valuation, CAPM beta, return volatility and return correlation of firms involved in the 
patent race.  Section IV provides a comparative-static analysis on parameters of market demand 
volatility, dividend yield of the patent value and technological volatility.  Section V concludes 
with a discussion of further research. 
 
 
I.  THE MODEL 
There are two all equity-financed firms, indexed by A and B, pursuing a single project.8  
At time t = 0, the two firms enter a race against each other to complete an invention.  The first 
firm to complete an invention (hereafter, the winner of the patent race) will be awarded a patent.  
During the course of the patent race, each firm makes continuous-time sequential investment 
decisions until the winner emerges.  Duopoly competition for the patent is modeled as a game in 
which there are three publicly observed state variables:  the value of the patent, and the expected 
cost-to-completion of each of the two firms.  These state variables are described as follows. 
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Patent Value and Market Demand Uncertainty.  A firm receives no positive cash flows 
unless it is the winner of the patent race, i.e., the first to complete the project and receive a patent.  
If the winning firm obtains the patent at time t , it immediately begins to receive an infinitely-
lived stochastic stream of cash flows, denoted ( )D t , which is valued by the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM).  The value of the winning firm is the value of this stream of cash flows.  
The losing firm receives nothing and becomes worthless.  The stochastic process ( )D t  is 
assumed to follow geometric Brownian motion.  Let µ  denote the drift, let β  denote the CAPM 
beta, let mσ  denote the market volatility, let Iσ  denote idiosyncratic volatility, and let σ denote 
dividend volatility. Then we can write  
m m I x
dD dt dz dz dt dw
D
µ βσ σ µ σ= + + = + .    ⑴. 
Here, dividend volatility, 2 2 2m Iσ β σ σ= + , is referred to as “market demand uncertainty.” It 
contains both systematic and idiosyncratic components.  Let mλ  denote the risk premium on the 
market portfolio, let fr  denote the risk-free rate, and let ( )mP t  denote the value of a share in the 
market portfolio with dividends reinvested. Then we can write   
( )m f m m m
m
dP r dt dz
P
λ σ= + + .     ⑵. 
Using Gordon’s growth formula, the present value of the stream of the patent cash flows, denoted 




r βλ µ= + − .  The “patent value” ( )x t  is one of the state variables 
affecting the value of both firms.  The patent value ( )x t  follows the process  
m m I x
dx dt dz dz dt dw
x
µ βσ σ µ σ= + + = + .    ⑶. 
Let δ  denote the “dividend yield,” the denominator in Gordon’s Growth Formula given by  
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( )




βλ µ= + − .      ⑷. 
Intuitively, the dividend yield δ  represents the rate at which the present value of the patent 
decays through time as a result of no patent being granted; it represents the opportunity cost of 
delaying winning the patent.  Intuitively, if the dividend yield δ  is smaller (holding the patent 
value ( )x t  constant), then the “option to delay” is more valuable and firms will have an 
incentive to pursue the patent less aggressively.  We assume 0δ >  to eliminate the scenario 
whereby firms wait forever for a more favorable patent value.  Because the patent value x  
indicates the overall economic condition of the industry, we refer to the time when x  is at high 
levels as a “bull market” and the time when x  is at low levels as a “bear market.” 
Investment Rates and Technological Uncertainty.  The state of the patent race is 
described by two state variables, ( )Ak t  and ( )Bk t , denoting the two firms’ expected “cost-to-
completion,” respectively.  We assume both ( ) 0Ak t >  and ( ) 0Bk t >  at the beginning of the 
race.  Let ( )AI t  and ( )BI t  denote the two firms’ investment rates, respectively.  A positive 
investment rate ( )AI t  tends to reduce ( )Ak t , and similarly a positive investment rate ( )BI t  
tends to reduce ( )Bk t .  A firm wins the patent race when its cost-to-completion falls to zero 
before the other firm does.  
 A special case of the random technology described by Pindyck’s [1993] is used. 9   
Expected cost-to-completion ( )Ak t  and ( )Bk t  are assumed to follow a diffusion process of the 
following form, where Aθ  and Bθ  are cost technological volatility parameters, which are 
referred to “idiosyncratic technological uncertainty” of firm A and firm B, respectively:  
( )1/ 2A A A A A Adk I dt I k dzθ= − +      ⑸. 
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( )1/ 2B B B B B Bdk I dt I k dzθ= − +      ⑹. 
Here, Adz  and Bdz denote idiosyncratic white noise processes, also distributed independently 
from the financial risks mdz  and xdz .  Our CAPM assumption implies that any risk associated 
with the expected cost-to-completion is diversifiable, i.e., it is priced in a risk neutral manner.  
This specification has several attractive features.  First, the drift terms AI dt−  and BI dt−  
indicate that a dollar of investment reduces expected cost-to-completion by a dollar.  Second, the 
diffusion terms ( )1/ 2A A A AI k dzθ  and ( )1/ 2B B B BI k dzθ  indicate that expected cost-to-
completion changes randomly, with many small unexpected improvements (reductions in ( )Ak t  
and ( )Bk t ) as well as many small unexpected setbacks (increases in ( )Ak t  and ( )Bk t ).  
Technological setbacks mean that a firm realizes that more money must be spent or more time is 
needed to pursue the project than was previously believed.10  Third, there is a “learning by doing” 
feature: a firm’s expected cost-to-completion does not change if the firm does not invest, i.e., 
0Adk =  if 0AI =  and 0Bdk =  if 0BI = .  Investing not only tends to push the firms towards 
victory by reducing expected cost-to-completion but also tends to reduce uncertainty about how 
much investment will eventually be required to drive ( )Ak t  or ( )Bk t  to zero.  Let maxAI  and 
max
BI  denote fixed maximum investment rates of firm A and firm B, respectively, reflecting their 
research bandwidths.  We assume firms have the same magnitude of research bandwidth, i.e., 
max max max
A BI I I= = .11  Firm A and firm B choose ( )AI t  and ( )BI t  from the closed interval 
max0, I⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ .  As we shall see later, the square root applied to ( )AI t  and ( )BI t  in the diffusion 
terms together with the assumption that there are no adjustment costs on capital will lead to 
“bang-bang” solutions in which a firm invests at the maximum rate or not at all.   Thus, both 
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firms face essentially a binary choice between investing at its maximum rate maxI  or not investing 
at all. 
 As the race unfolds, a firm could become the follower, whose cost-to-completion is 
higher than that of the other firm ( ; , ; ,i jk k i A B j B A> = = ), or the leader, whose cost-to-
completion is lower than that of the other firm ( ; , ; ,i jk k i A B j B A< = = ).  The firms could 
also tie in the race ( A Bk k= ), which is referred to as “head-to-head.” 
Firm Value.  There are three state variables which describe the state of competition 
between the two firms:  the patent value ( )x t , the expected cost-to-completion of firm A ( )Ak t , 
and the expected cost-to-completion of firm B ( )Bk t .  We assume that both firms observe all the 
three state variables at all times.  Firm value of each firm is a function of the three state variables.  
Let ( ), ,A A BF x k k  and ( ), ,B A BF x k k  denote the firm value of firm A and firm B, respectively.   
 Equilibrium.  We employ the solution concept of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (see 
Maskin and Tirole [1988]).12  For a given date t  and for every state  ( ), ,A Bx k k  there is a 
subgame starting from that state.  At each subgame, the information set of either firm is a set of 
realizations of the state variables x , Ak , and Bk  at time t.  There are countless paths leading to 
this set of realizations.  However, this set of realizations is the only payoff-relevant information at 
time t .  The action set available to each firm includes any investment rate level in the range of 
[ ]max0, I .  In equilibrium, a Markov equilibrium strategy maps the information set to the action 
set for each firm.   
 A firm’s investment decision is a function of the three state variables: ( ), ,A A BI x k k  and 
( ), ,B A BI x k k .  At subgame ( ), ,A Bx k k , let the investment strategy profile 
( ) ( ){ }, , , , ,Aopt A B Bopt A BI x k k I x k k  construct a Nash Equilibrium such that a firm maximizes its 
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firm value by optimally choosing an investment rate given the other firm’s optimal investment 
strategy.  Since the mathematical derivation is symmetric for the two firms, we only show the 
derivation of firm A’s strategy.  Given firm B’s optimal investment strategy ( ), ,Bopt A BI x k k  at 
subgame ( ), ,A Bx k k , ( ) ( ), , , ,A A B Aopt A BI x k k I x k k=  solves firm A’s value function: 







, , , ,
    
               . .     ( )    ,
    ( )
A
A A B A rdt A A A B B
I I
A A A A A A
B Bopt B Bopt B B
F x k k Max I dt E e F x dx k dk k dk
dx xdt xdw
s t dk I dt I k dz t






= − + + + +
⎧ = +⎪
= − + ∀⎨⎪
= − +⎩
   ⑺. 
 The expectation operator notation *{...}E  refers to the expectation with respect to the 
risk-neutral probabilities.  The risk neutral probabilities are obtained by changing µ  to 
*
mµ µ βλ= − , i.e.  by deflating the true growth rate on the patent’s cash flows by the risk 
premium on the patent’s cash flows, so that Gordon’s growth formula gives the same value for 
winning the patent in a risk neutral model as in the CAPM model, i.e.   
*( ) ( ) /( ) ( ) /( )f m fx t D t r D t rβλ µ µ= + − = − .    ⑻. 
Note that the dividend yield δ  remains the same and is given by  
*
f m fr rδ βλ µ µ= + − = − .     ⑼. 
 The intuition behind this result is that the investors can hedge out market risk associated with 
investments in the two firms by trading the market portfolio; this leaves them with idiosyncratic 
risk, with respect to which they are risk neutral.  Therefore, the value of the firm can be evaluated 
without knowing investors’ risk preference or the true growth rate µ  on the patent’s cash flows.  
A proof of this point is provided in appendix 1. 
 Note that the equations state that the value of a firm is the present value of its risk-
adjusted cash flows, discounted at the risk-free rate.  The positive cash flows are the cash flows 
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on the patent, received if and when the firm wins.  If a firm loses the race, the firm receives zero.  
The negative cash flows are the cost-to-completion, which we can think of as new equity being 
injected into the firms.  Because the model fits specifically venture-capital backed growth firms, 
we can interpret a firm’s expected cost-to-completion ik  as the expected amount of “follow-on” 
capital that firm i needs to be successful.  The maximum investment rate maxI  can be interpreted 
as the maximum “burn rate.”  As the race goes on, a firm’s value may increase because the new 
capital invested in the firm allows it to improve its chances of winning the patent race.  Even 
under the risk-neutral probabilities, the value of a firm increases faster than the risk-free rate 
because new capital (like negative dividends) is being injected into the firm when it invests. 
    In the continuous-time framework, the Bellman Equation of firm A given firm B’s 
optimal investment strategy BoptI  is 
[ ]







0A A A B B B
A
A A A A A A Bopt B A A A
xx x k k k k k kI I
A B
f fMax x F r xF I k F F I k F F r Fσ δ θ θ
∈
+ − + − − + − + −
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
=⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭  ⑽.     
The Bellman Equation is nicely grouped with brackets into four parts as shown above.  The first 
part corresponds to market demand uncertainty, the second part corresponds to firm A’s own 
technological uncertainty, and the third part corresponds to the competitor firm B’s technological 
uncertainty, representing competitive uncertainty.  Even though the two firms’ technological 
uncertainties are independent, each firm must consider its competitor’s technological uncertainty.  
The final part represents opportunity costs. 
 Because of the square root term in the processes of the cost-to-completion and the 
assumption of no adjustment costs on capital, the Bellman Equation is linear in each firm’s 
investment strategies AI  and BI .  The linearity of the Bellman equation implies that in the 
continuous-time limit, the investment strategy of firm A depends on the coefficient of AI  in the 
Bellman equation of firm A, and the investment strategy of firm B depends on the coefficient of 
BI  in the Bellman equation of firm B.  If the coefficient is positive, the firm has a dominant 
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strategy to invest at the maximum rate maxI .  If the coefficient is negative, the firm has a 
dominant strategy to choose a zero investment rate.  If the coefficient is zero, the firm is 
indifferent as to its investment rate.  In the continuous-time limit, a zero coefficient is a zero 
probability event.  Hence, the action set available to a firm becomes binary: { },Invest Mothball .  
We also assume that the firms make a binary choice in the numerical implementation. 
 In the numerical implementation, if the firms have dominant strategies, then each firm 
plays its dominant strategy.13 Otherwise, there may be multiple solutions and the solutions may 
involve mixed strategies.  When there are multiple equilibria in which only one firm invests and 
the firms are indifferent as to who invests, we assume that the firm with larger value from 
investing makes the investment.  When there are multiple equilibria in which the firms are 
indifferent between both invest and both mothball, we assume that both firms invest.  Our results 
remain robust when these assumptions are relaxed.  When equilibrium involves mixed strategies, 
we assume that firms play mixed strategies although this is not reflected in the above notation. 
Except for the small region of mixed strategies, the strategies of the firms can be 
described by four sets of points, i.e., both firms invest, only firm A invests, only firm B invests, 
and neither firm invests. 
 To complete a description of the equilibrium, it is also necessary to discuss the joint 
monopoly scenario in which two firms become separate divisions of a joint monopoly but the 
research bandwidths of the two firms remain uncombined.  Let ( ), ,JM A BF x k k  denote the value 
of the joint monopoly, the Bellman equation now has the joint monopoly maximizing value by 
choosing both investment rates: 







A A A B B B
A A B B
JM JM A A A JM JM B B B JM JM JM
xx f x fk k k k k kI I I I
Max x F r xF I k F F I k F F r Fσ δ θ θ
∈ ∈⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
+ − + − − + − − + − =
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭ . ⑾. 
The Bellman equation of the joint monopoly remains linear in both AI  and BI .  This paper does 
not consider the scenario in which one firm submits a bid for the other firm to achieve any degree 
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of collusive outcome.  Kyle and Meng [2003] extend this paper to allow strategic investments and 
acquisitions to be endogenous equilibrium outcomes. 
 For comparison purposes, we also construct a hypothetical portfolio comprising 
competing firms A and B.  Let ( ), ,P A BF x k k  denote the value of the portfolio, then we have 
( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , ,P A B A A B B A BF x k k F x k k F x k k= + .  We will compare this hypothetical portfolio 




II.  NUMERICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
 Since an effort to obtain a closed-form solution for this game is likely futile, we have 
solved the model numerically by using both the explicit finite difference method and the “brute 
force” lattice method.  The properties of the model are robust to both methods.  Here we only 
provide a detailed discussion of the lattice method and related properties. 
 Assumptions.  The assumed values of the exogenous parameters in the base model are as 
follows: 3%,δ = 5%,fr = 1.00,β = 20%,mσ = 30%,σ =  0.60,A Bθ θ= = max 10.I =  
These values imply * 2 2 2 1/ 22%, ( ) .f I mrµ δ σ σ β σ= − = = −  Time is discretized, with decisions 
made at N+1 dates 0 = 0t , 1t , …, Nt  = T, so that 1  n nt t t one month+∆ = − = .   The horizon T is 
chosen as 50 years.  Thus, we have N=600.  It is worth noting that the results are robust under a 
wide spectrum of parameter values. 
For the purpose of numerical implementation, we also discretize the space of the three 
state variables.  Instead of discretizing three diffusion state variables themselves, we discretize 
three transformed variables: ( ) ( )1/ 2ln ( ) , ( ) ,Ax t k t and ( )1/ 2( )Bk t .  Note that the dynamics of 
the transformed variables are given from Ito’s lemma by 
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( )( ) 21ln ,
2f
d x r dt dzδ σ σ⎛ ⎞= − − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠     ⑿. 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 11/ 2 2 2 21 1 11 ,2 4 2A A A A A A Ad k I k dt I dzθ θ−⎛ ⎞= − + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠   ⒀. 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 11/ 2 2 2 21 1 11 .2 4 2B B B B B B Bd k I k dt I dzθ θ−⎛ ⎞= − + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠   ⒁. 
The chosen transformations have the property that the instantaneous variance in the transformed 
variables is constant.  For the value of the patent ( )x t , we choose 201 points, equally spaced in 
the transformed variable ( )ln x , such that the smallest point corresponds to x  = 1 and the largest 
point corresponds to x  = 10,000.  For each of the expected cost-to-completion variables Ak  and 
Bk , we choose 61 points, equally spaced in the transformed variables 1/ 2( )Ak  and 1/ 2( )Bk , such 
that the smallest value corresponds to 0A Bk k= =  and the largest value corresponds to 
225A Bk k= = . 
 The game is solved by using the “brute force” lattice method of backward induction from 
the terminal date 50Nt years= , corresponding to N=600.  We use an Euler approximation for 
all three transformed state variables.  We approximate the normally distributed transition 
probabilities in the Euler approximation by mapping the true outcome to the closest transformed 
outcome in the space of transformed state variables within two standard deviations (rounded up) 
of the expected outcome.  When a cost-to-completion variable hits its minimum value, we assume 
that the respective firm wins the patent at that point.  If both firms win the patent at the same time, 
we split the patent value equally between the two firms.  When the state variables otherwise hit 
their maximum or minimum values, we do not assume that they are absorbed; random 
fluctuations are allowed to push them back into the interior of the space of state variables at a 
later date.  Note that our numerical implementation allows the state to jump more than one grid 
point from one month to the next.  A typical large jump is two or three grid points.  In the 
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continuous-time model, by contrast, a firm cannot move from one state to another 
discontinuously; it must pass through intervening states.14 
 Since the strategy space is three dimensional, for the purpose of describing the 
equilibrium, we choose a patent value of x  = 100 (e.g.  $100 million), the midpoint of the grid of 
the transformed variable ( )ln x , then discuss the results for various values of the firms’ costs-to-
completion in the next section.     
Note that the expected cost-to-completion variables Ak  and Bk  have not been discounted 
to obtain their present values.  The value of the patent, x , is the present value of the cash flows 
generated by the patent if a firm wins immediately.  If a firms wins at some point in the future, 
the present value of the patent is reduced by the foregone dividends, which accrue at rate δ . 
 
III.  FINANCIAL PROPERTIES OF EQUILBRIUM 
 This section examines some financial properties of the equilibrium revealed in the 
numerical example.  We provide the results for the joint monopoly, firm A in the patent race, and 
the portfolio comprising firms A and B in the race.  We also provide comparison between the 
portfolio and the joint monopoly.  In each subsection below, we first provide a summary of the 
results, and then discuss the results in detail by illustrating graphs of the numerical example.   
A. Over-Investment and Rent Dissipation.   
Summary of the results in this sub-section:  
1). Competition makes firms eager to invest and as a result they over-invest relative to the 
joint monopoly scenario. 
2). Over-investment induced by competition erodes the aggregate value of the firms 
relative to the joint monopoly scenario. 
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 Properties of Investment Strategies of Joint Monopoly.  To further understand the 
duopoly competitive equilibrium, we use the scenario of joint monopoly as a useful benchmark.  
Joint monopoly by definition implements a collusive outcome, which maximizes the joint profits 
of the two firms, given that the two firms maintain separate research bandwidths.  The investment 
behaviors of the two firms are illustrated in Figure 1, where the value of the patent is fixed at x  = 
100, the horizontal axis is the expected cost-to-completion of firm A Ak  and the vertical axis is 
the expected cost-to-completion of firm B Bk .  In this figure, the light gray (orange) area is 
where firm A invests and firm B does not; the dark (blue) area is where firm B invests and firm A 
does not; and the un-shaded white area is where neither firm invests.  The key properties to note 
in this figure are the following: 
1.  The point where each firm’s expected cost-to-completion is equal to the value of the 
patent is well inside the area where neither firm invests.  The real option value of waiting induces 
the joint monopolist to delay investment when a naïve NPV rule would suggest that the project 
has a positive NPV. 
2.  One of the two firms will invest if either of the two firms has an expected cost-to-
completion less than 36.  In this case, the firm which invests is typically the firm with the lower 
expected cost-to-completion.  This can be seen in Figure 1, where the investment area of firm A 
corresponds to an area above the 45-degree line, and the investment area of firm B is below the 
45-degree line. 
3.  Although it is theoretically possible that under joint monopoly both firms invest at the 
same time, this does not happen in this example.  The rent dissipation that results from two firms 
investing simultaneously is always greater than the benefit of earlier completion of the project.  
However, two firms in a joint monopoly can invest simultaneously if the patent value is set at a 
much higher level than that used in this example.  In that case, both firms invest along the 45-
degree line not far from the origin.  Moreover, if the dividend yield is much higher than 3% that 
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was used in this example, the joint monopoly is eager to generate cash flows from the patent at 
the earliest possible time.  As a result, if the patent value is large enough, both firms in the joint 
monopoly will invest simultaneously.   
Properties of Investment Strategies of Duopoly Competition.  Figures 2 and 3 illustrate 
equilibrium investment strategies for firm A and the hypothetical portfolio comprising competing 
firms A and B in the duopoly patent race.  The layout for these figures is the same as in Figure 1, 
with the patent value fixed at 100, firm A’s cost-to-completion plotted on the horizontal axis and 
firm B’s cost-to-completion plotted on the vertical axis.  In Figure 2, the light gray (yellow) 
region is where firm A invests and the un-shaded white region is where firm A mothballs.  
Duopoly competition prompts firm A to be more aggressive in making investments than it is in 
the case of joint monopoly, which is evident if one compares Figure 2 with Figure 1.  Investment 
strategies of both firms A and B are plotted in Figure 3.  As in Figure 1, the light gray (yellow) 
area is where firm A invests but firm B does not, and the dark (blue) area is where firm B invests 
but firm A does not.  The medium gray (green) area is where both firms invest.  The 45-degree 
line, also called the “equal-cost-to-completion line,” is where firms are head-to-head.  Important 
properties of this graph are the following: 
1.  There is an extensive area where both firms invest “inefficiently” in comparison with 
the joint monopoly case.  When two firms are close in the competition, they both invest around 
the equal-cost-to-completion line (45-degree line).  In the northwest or southeast regions where 
one firm is way ahead in the competition, both firms invest according to the joint monopoly 
investment rule. 
2.  The northeast boundary of the medium gray (green) area where both firms invest 
reaches the point where each firm’s expected cost-to-completion is approximately equal to the 
value of the patent.  Competition dissipates the real option value of waiting as will be discussed in 
detailed when we discuss properties of firm value. 
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3.  Figure 4 shows the effect of an increase in the patent value from 100 to 151 on the 
firms’ investment strategies.  It has the same scale and color scheme as Figure 3.  The main 
difference is that investment regions are larger due to an increased profitability of the patent.  
This implies that a firm is more likely to invest during a bull market when the size of the market 
x  is high.15 Intuitively, the investment regions shift outward along rays from the origin.  This 
intuition makes it possible to describe the dynamics of the patent race.  When firm A invests, 
resolution of uncertainty results in movements toward east and west, but not north and south.  
Success of firm A pushes points west, and firm A wins when points hit the vertical axis.  When 
firm B invests, resolution of uncertainty results in movements toward north and south, but not in 
movements toward east and west.  Success of firm B pushes points on the graph south, and firm B 
wins the patent when points hit the horizontal axis.  Since increases in patent values shift the 
entire investment region along a ray away from the origin, we can also think of the shift as having 
a similar relative effect as staying on the same Figure but shifting the point towards the origin.  In 
other words, from a graphical perspective, an increase in patent value is like a reduction in both 
firms’ cost-to-completion with a change in scale.  Using this intuition, we can think of an increase 
in patent value as a shift of points along a ray towards the origin and a decrease in patent value as 
a shift of points along a ray away from the origin. 
Properties of Firm Value of Joint Monopoly.  Figure 5 plots iso-value lines for the joint 
monopoly.  The layout for this figure is the same as in Figures 1-3, with the patent value fixed at 
100, firm A’s cost-to-completion plotted on the horizontal axis and firm B’s cost-to-completion 
plotted on the vertical axis.  The dotted-curves are the contour plot of the joint monopoly’s 
investment regions.  The intervals between the iso-value lines are 2.  The iso-value lines for the 
joint monopoly’s value have the same shape as the Leontief technology with a kink on the 45-
degree line.  As one of the properties of the Leontief technology, the value of the joint monopoly 
is determined by the efficient firm whose cost-to-completion is lower.  As shown in the graph, the 
value of the joint monopoly is increasing as firm A’s cost-to-completion decreases in the area 
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above the 45-degree line where firm A invests, or increasing as firm B’s cost-to-completion 
decreases in the area below the 45-degree line where firm B invests.  As the size of the market 
increases and thus points shift along a ray towards the origin using the change of scale intuition, 
the value of the joint monopoly increases. 
Properties of Firm Value of Duopoly Competition.  Equilibrium firm value for firm A 
and the hypothetical portfolio comprising firms A and B in the duopoly patent race are illustrated 
in Figures 6 and 7, respectively.  The layout for these figures is the same as in Figure 5.  The 
dotted-curves are the contour plot of both firms’ investment regions.  As shown in Figure 6, firm 
A’s value is non-increasing in its own cost-to-completion and non-decreasing in the other firm’s 
cost-to-completion.  The intervals between the iso-value lines represent factors of two in value.  
Figure 6 shows that dramatic changes in firm A’s value occur in response to seemingly modest 
changes in firm A’s costs-to-completion.  Firm A’s value drops quickly after firm A lags behind 
in the competition (below 45-degree line), especially after firm A stops investing (below the 
lower dotted-curve).  When firm A just stops investing (just away from the lower dotted-curve), 
its value decreases from 2 million to 1 million.  As shown in Figure 7, the sum of the firm values 
of competing firms A and B is also symmetric along the 45-degree line with a kink on the 45-
degree line as the firm value of the joint monopoly.  However, the kinks are more tilted toward 
the origin, indicating the value of the portfolio is lower relative to that in the case of joint 
monopoly.  By comparing the values of the portfolio and the joint monopoly, we find that over-
investment caused by competition erodes firms’ values as documented in the existing patent race 
literature.  Figure 8 provides level curves for the percentage value dissipation as a function of the 
two firms’ costs-to-completion.  The expected rent dissipation is measured as the percentage 
difference between the combined values of the two firms under joint monopoly and duopoly 
patent race.  The graph shows that rent dissipation is greater than 2% only around the equal cost-
to-completion line.  In this region, it is not efficient from the perspective of joint monopoly for 
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the firm with higher cost-to-completion to invest, but the firm nevertheless invests because it is 
afraid to lose the competition.  The maximum amount of rent dissipation can be in excess of 35%. 
What Do We Learn from Over-investment and Value Dissipation?  In venture capital 
industry, a venture capitalist can invest in several start-up firms.  These start-ups are called 
portfolio firms for the venture capitalist.  Venture capitalists typically have substantial control 
over portfolio firms. Therefore, venture capitalists are more like joint monopoly.  This model 
implies that venture capitalists should encourage their portfolio firms to coordinate more.  In 
addition, if a venture capitalist owns the leader, it is valuable for it to include the follower into its 
portfolio.  In doing so, the venture capitalist can not only potentially improve efficiency by 
reducing over-investment and value dissipation, but also earn a good hedge plan since the returns 
of the leader and the follower are negatively correlated as we will detail in the next subsection. 
 
B. Higher CAPM Beta, Higher Return Volatility and More Negative Correlation between 
the Returns of the Two Firms. 
Summary of the results in this sub-section:  
1). Firms involved in a patent race have a higher CAPM beta, a higher return volatility 
and more negative return correlation relative to the joint monopoly when both firms invest in the 
patent race. 
2). A firm’s beta is a complicated non-linear function of its cost-to-completion or firm 
value.  When a firm is close to victory, its beta is close to the patent beta.  When a firm drops 
back further from victory but is still investing, its percentage exposure to patent-value-risk 
increases.  When a firm continuously experiences setbacks and finally stops investing, its firm 
beta falls with its cost-to-completion. 
3). The magnitude of the annualized return volatility of a start-up can be in excess of 
100%.  This high level of return volatility for a venture-capital backed start-up is largely 
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attributed to technological risks and is consistent with recent empirical findings documented by 
Cochrane [2004]. 
4). A start-up’s return volatility can be decomposed into three components corresponding 
the three sources of risk: systematic market demand risk, idiosyncratic technological risk of this 
firm and idiosyncratic technological risk of this firm’s competitor.  The proportion of each 
component changes with the firm’s position in the race.  When the firm is close to victory, its 
return volatility is mainly caused by market demand risk.  When the firm is close to its competitor 
in the race, idiosyncratic technological risks of both firms account for the majority of its return 
volatility.  When the firm is far behind and stops investing, the firm essentially stays away from 
the competition unless its competitor experiences setbacks.  This firm’s return volatility is mainly 
caused by its competitor’s idiosyncratic technological risk in this situation. 
5). When both firms invest in a patent race, a firm’s CAPM beta and return volatility 
increase as a firm has technological setbacks or its competitor makes positive progresses. 
6). The returns of the two firms evolved in the duopoly patent race are perfectly 
correlated by the common factor of patent value when neither firm invests and most negatively 
correlated when both invest. 
 
In this paper, “return” refers to the return on firm value over interval dt , that is, the 
percentage change in firm value over interval dt , taking into account any dividend distributed 
over that interval.  Firms’ investments can be regarded as negative dividends.  Since the firms are 
all-equity financed, the return on firm value equals the return on equity.  Remember ( )mP t  is the 
value of a share in the market portfolio with dividends reinvested.  Since ( )mP t  follows 
geometric Brownian motion, ( )m f m m m
m
dP r dt dz
P
λ σ= + + , the market return, 
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( ) ( )mm f m m m
m
dPR t r dt dz
P
λ σ= = + + , is normally distributed with mean ( )f mr dtλ+  and 
variance 2mdtσ .  Remember mλ  is the market risk premium. 
Proposition 1:  In the continuous-time limit, the formula for a firm’s CAPM beta, risk premium, 
return variance and return covariance with its competitor in a duopoly patent race with the three 
types of uncertainty discussed previously can be derived as follows. 
 1). A firm’s CAPM beta is the product of the beta on the patent’s cash flows (the patent 
beta) and the elasticity of the firm’s value with respect to the patent value: 
,  ,ii xi
x F i A B
F





ε =  is the elasticity.  
Accordingly, a firm’s risk premium is the product of the risk premium on the patent’s cash flows 
(the patent risk premium) and the elasticity of firm value with respect to the patent value, i.e., 
( ) ( ) ,  ,i i m m m i A Bλ β λ βε λ βλ ε λε= = = = = , where λ  is the patent risk premium.   
 2). A firm’s return volatility and return covariance with its competitor over interval dt  
can be decomposed into market demand uncertainty, this firm’s idiosyncratic technological 
uncertainty and the other firm’s idiosyncratic technological uncertainty: 
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  ⒂. 
( ) ( ) ( )2 22, A A B BA B A BA BA A B B A A A B B Bx x k k k kA B A B A B A BF F F FF FdF I dt dF I dtCov x I k I k dtF F F F F F F Fσ θ θ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− −
= + +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦
 ⒃. 
Properties of CAPM Beta of Joint Monopoly.  Figure 9 shows level curves for the joint 
monopoly’s CAPM beta as a function of the two firms’ costs-to-completion under the assumption 
that the beta on the patent’s cash flows is 1.00.  The dotted-curves are the contour plot of firms’ 
investment regions in the case of the joint monopoly.  The level curves for the joint monopoly’s 
beta have the same shape as the Leontief technology.  When the efficient firm whose cost-to-
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completion is lower makes positive progresses (points move south or west), the joint monopoly’s 
beta decreases.  But the beta is always greater than one.  Intuitively, this reflects the fact that the 
joint monopoly incorporates real options on the value of the patents.  In this numerical example 
that the patent value x = 100, the beta of the joint monopoly is no higher than 1.4. 
Properties of CAPM Beta of Duopoly Competition.  Figures 10 and 11 show level curves 
for CAPM betas of firm A and the portfolio comprising firms A and B in the patent race.  The 
layout for these figures is the same as that in Figure 9.  The dotted-curves are the contour plot of 
firms’ investment regions.  Figure 10 makes it clear that a firm’s beta is a complicated non-linear 
function of its cost-to-completion.  When firm A is close to victory, its beta is close to the patent 
beta.  The beta is slightly above 1 due to the real option value.  When firm A drops back from 
victory but still investing (the region above the lower dotted-curve), its CAPM beta increases.  
The beta can be in excess of 2.  As firm A continues having bad luck and finally stops investing 
(the region blow the lower dotted-curve), its firm beta falls with its cost-to-completion.  When 
firm A lags far behind, firm A’s value is less sensitive to the patent value and more sensitive to its 
competitor’s move.  The risk associated with the move of the firm’s competitor is its competitor’s 
technological risk which is idiosyncratic.  An interesting point to note is that when both firms 
invest, firm A’s beta increases as firm A experiences setbacks (points move east) or firm B makes 
improvements (points move south).  It is worthwhile to examine whether this is the case by 
studying the pharmaceutical industry or the software industry.  The beta of the portfolio 
comprising both firms A and B, plotted in Figure 11, is calculated as the value weighted betas of 
the two firms.  The range of the portfolio beta is between 1.1 and 1.8 in the region where both 
firms invest and intensely compete.  The beta of the portfolio is higher in this region than that of 
the joint monopoly (shown in Figure 9), implying that competition drives up firms’ beta. 
Properties of Annualized Return Volatility of Joint Monopoly.  Figure 12 shows level 
curves for the joint monopoly’s annualized return volatility.  The layout of the axes is as in 
previous figures.  The dotted-curves are the contour plot of the investment regions for the joint 
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monopoly.  The level curves for the joint monopoly’s annualized return volatility have the same 
shape as the Leontief technology.  When the efficient firm whose cost-to-completion is lower 
makes positive progresses (points move south or west), the joint monopoly’s return volatility 
decreases.  When either firm in the joint monopoly is close to the finishing line (firm A is close to 
the vertical axis or firm B is close to the horizontal axis), it is certain that the joint monopoly will 
complete the project and receive the patent.  Therefore, the joint monopoly’s return volatility is 
caused only by the market demand volatility σ , which is set to 30%σ = .  In general, the return 
volatility of the joint monopoly will not be higher than 40%. 
Properties of Annualized Return Volatility of Duopoly Competition.  Figure 13 plots 
level curves for the annualized return volatility of firm A in the race.  Figure 14 plots level curves 
for the fraction of firm A’s return volatility caused by its idiosyncratic risk defined as the sum of 
the two firms’ idiosyncratic technological risks (the sum of the second and third components of 
Eq. 15, the firm’s return volatility formula).  The dotted-curves are the contour plot of both firms’ 
investment regions.  Figures 13 and 14 show that in the region where both firms invest and 
intensely compete,  firm A’s return volatility and the fraction of idiosyncratic risk are increasing 
as firm A experiences setbacks (points move east) or firm B makes progress and moves towards 
south.  Firm A’s return volatility can be in excess of 100%.  This high level of return volatility is 
mainly attributed to idiosyncratic risk which accounts for 90% of the return volatility.  This result 
is consistent with the empirical findings documented in Cochrane [2004].  Cochrane [2004] 
studies the risk and return of venture capital and finds that the arithmetic returns of venture 
capital, even after correction of selection bias, are very volatile, and the standard deviation is 
about 100%.  When firm A over invests relative to the joint monopoly (the region blow 45-degree 
line and above the lower dotted-curve), the over-investments push up firm A’s return volatility 
and idiosyncratic risk as predicted by the return volatility formula Eq. 15.  In a bull market, as the 
size of the market increases (points shift along a ray towards the origin), firms are more likely to 
invest and as a result they have higher return volatility and idiosyncratic risk.  When firm A is 
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close to victory, it is almost certain for it to win.  Therefore, its idiosyncratic risk becomes tiny 
and firm A’s return volatility is mainly caused by the market demand uncertainty.  As shown in 
Figure 13, the return volatility is equal to the parameter value set for market demand volatility 
30%σ =  when firm A is close to vertical axis.  When firm A is far behind in the race (the 
southeast corner), it stops investing until firm B experiences significant setbacks.  Firm B’s 
idiosyncratic technological risk accounts for about 90% of firm A’s return volatility in that region. 
Figure 15 provides level curves for the annualized return volatility of the portfolio 
comprising both firms A and B in the patent race.  The portfolio return volatility is calculated as 
the volatility of the value weighted returns of firms A and B.  As shown in the graph, high levels 
of return volatility are concentrated in the region where both firms invest and actively compete.  
The return volatility of the portfolio can be up to 100%.  One implication of the equilibrium 
worthy of further testing is that higher aggregate investments of competing firms are associated 
with higher return volatilities and idiosyncratic risks.  A comparison of the annualized return 
volatility of the portfolio and that of the joint monopoly confirms this implication.  Figure 16 
provides level curves for the percentage difference between the return volatility of the portfolio 
and that of the joint monopoly.  The graph shows that the return volatility of the portfolio is at 
least 30% higher than that of the joint monopoly when both firms invest.  In this region, it is 
usually inefficient for the firm with higher cost-to-completion to invest, but the firm nevertheless 
invests because it is afraid losing the competition.  This aggressive investment behavior pushes 
up return volatility.  The maximum amount of the percentage difference can be 200%. 
Return Correlation.  Figure 17 provides level curves for the correlation of the returns of 
competing firms A and B, calculated from the firms’ return volatility and return covariance.  As 
in previous graphs, the dotted-curves are the contour plot of both firms’ investment regions.  In 
the region where neither firm invests, the values of the two firms are in principle perfectly 
correlated by the common factor of patent value.  The correlation shown in the graph is 1 or very 
close to 1 due to discretized approximation.  While resolution of uncertainty about the patent 
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value makes the firms’ returns positively correlated, resolution of uncertainty about the cost-to-
completion through investments introduces negative correlation.  The return correlation can be -
0.7 in the region where both firms invest.  In a bull market, as the size of the market increases 
(thus points shift along a ray towards the origin), firms are more likely to invest such that the 
return correlation becomes more negative.   
 
IV.  COMPARATIVE-STATIC ANALYSIS 
 In this section, we analyze briefly how market demand volatility, dividend yield, and 
technological volatility affect firms’ investment decisions.16  
A. Market Demand Uncertainty Effect (σ  Effect)   
In the base model, the market demand volatility parameter σ  is set to 30%σ = .  By 
increasing market demand volatility from 30%σ =  to 50%σ = , we find the following results. 
1). On investment strategy:  The effect of an increase in market demand uncertainty on 
investment strategies of a firm depends on the firm’s position in the patent race.  As market 
demand uncertainty increases, a firm delays making investments when it is either far ahead or 
behind in the race; it is eager to invest when the two firms are close in the race. 
2). On value: As market demand uncertainty increases, a firm receives the real option 
premia of delay when it delays making investments. 
3). Empirical implication:  The relationship between investment and market demand 
uncertainty depends on a firm’s position: it is negative when a firm is far ahead or behind, and it 
is positive when the firms are close in the race. 
With market demand uncertainty, it is optimal for firms to delay making investments and 
wait for more information about the profitability of the new technology.  This is why the existing 
literature on investment under uncertainty has concluded that the relationship between market 
demand uncertainty and investment is negative.  But an increase in market demand uncertainty 
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leads to a higher value of the option to delay as well as a higher up potential on patent value.  In 
an environment with strategic interactions, any delay in investment may result in losing the 
higher patent value to the competitor.  Balancing these pros and cons, a firm may find it optimal 
to delay making investments when it is either well ahead or far behind in the race, but is eager to 
invest when competition is intense.  In sum, we find that the relationship between investment and 
market demand uncertainty depends on a firm’s position in the race.17  
B. Dividend Yield Effect (δ  Effect) 
In the base model, the dividend yield δ  is set to 3%δ = .  By increasing dividend yield 
from 3%δ =  to 5%δ = , we find the following results. 
1). On investment strategy:  The effect of an increase in dividend yield on investment 
strategies of a firm depends again on the firm’s position in the race.  As dividend yield increases, 
a firm is eager to invest when it is ahead, but delays making investments when it is behind or 
close to the other firm.   
 Intuitively, the dividend yield δ  represents the rate at which the present value of the 
patent decays through time as a result of no patent being granted; it represents the opportunity 
cost of deferring victory.  One might expect that a firm always has incentives to invest when δ  
increases.  This is the case when the project can be completed instantly, as in the model of 
McDonald and Siegel [1986].  When a project cannot be completed instantly, the result is not at 
all straight forward due to conflicting factors as explained in Majd and Pindyck [1986].  In that 
case, the winning firm can only obtain the patent upon completion.  Holding the risk free rate, 
market risk premium and patent beta constant, the true growth rate µ  and the risk-neutral growth 
rate *µ  decrease as dividend yield increases, which is evident from Eq. 9.  So as dividend yield 
increases, the value of the patent at completion may be lower, giving firms an incentive to 
withhold investments.  When a firm is close to victory, it is eager to invest more to save dividends.  
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However, when a firm is close to or lags behind its competitor, it will withhold investments 
expecting that the patent value will be reduced.   
C. Technological Uncertainty Effect (θ  Effect) 
 In the base model, the firms’ technological volatility parameters Aθ  and Bθ  are set to 
0.6A Bθ θ= = .  Here we fix firm B’s technological volatility parameter to 0.6Bθ =  and change 
firm A’s technological volatility parameter to 0.9Aθ =  and 0.3Aθ = .  We find the following 
results. 
  1). On investment strategy:  An increase in the follower's technological uncertainty will 
encourage both firms to invest.  An increase in the leader's technological uncertainty, however, 
will encourage the leader to invest but discourage the follower from investing.  In other words, an 
increase in a firm’s technological uncertainty encourages the firm to invest regardless of its 
position in the race.  In contrast, the higher uncertainty encourages the firm’s competitor to invest 
if the competitor is the leader but discourages if the competitor is the follower.   
2). Empirical implication:  The relationship between aggregate investments of two firms 
evolved in a patent race and one firm’s idiosyncratic technological risk depends on this firm’s 
position in the race.  The aggregate investments are non-decreasing in the follower’s idiosyncratic 
technological risk. 
 
One of the nice features of the process of the expected cost-to-completion is that 
investments of a firm can result in technological improvements as well as technological setbacks.  
From the follower’s perspective, an increase in its own technological uncertainty gives it a chance 
to catch up, so it invests aggressively.  In contrast, an increase in technological uncertainty of the 
leader may result in the leader’s setbacks, therefore, gives the follower an incentive to withhold 
investments pending more information on the leader’s move in order to save investment costs.  
From the leader’s perspective, an increase in its own technological uncertainty gives it an 
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incentive to invest so that it can learn more information about investment costs and resolve its 
technological uncertainty.  An increase in the follower’s technological uncertainty may help the 
follower catch up, and therefore gives the leader an incentive to invest so as to maintain its 
leading position.  In sum, the relationship between aggregate investments of both firms and a 
firm’s idiosyncratic technological risk depends on the position of this firm in the race. 
In all, the above sensitivity analysis implies the following: 
Implication of the Comparative-Static Analysis: Firm position of a firm relative to that of its 
competitor in a race is an important control variable when we investigate a firm’s investment 
behavior and other financial properties.  We can use the degree of maturity or superiority of a 
firm’s technology as proxy for its position in a patent race. 
Regarding private start-ups, venture capitalists typically do stage-financing to monitor the 
start-ups.  There are financing round A, round B, round C ….  We could proxy a firm’s position 
by using which financing round the firm is at.  For public firms, it is harder to proxy firms’ 
position.  But, there should be some specific industrial characteristic, like the milestone ladder of 
a technology, which can be used as a criterion to rank technologies in each high-technology 
sector.  For example, higher density indicates a more superior drive in the disk drive industry (as 
in Josh Lerner [1997]).  If the objective is to reach a certain level of density, it is reasonable to 
assume that the firm with the higher level of density needs less money or less time to reach the 
targeted level.  Another example is that there are standard stages of clinical trials in the 
biotechnology industry to indicate the degree of maturity of a technology.  A firm at FDA 
approval stage could be reasonably assumed to spend less money or less time to receive an 
approval than a firm who is still at clinical trial stage I. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 This paper develops a continuous-time real-options patent-race model to analyze 
financial properties of venture-capital backed start-up firms. The numerical analysis of the model 
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can help entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, limited partners and other investors to make better 
decisions.  The model can also serve as guidance for some future empirical work as venture 
capital databases become available. 
 This paper can also be extended in the following directions.  This paper emphasizes the 
social loss resulting from a patent race.  Further research can expand the scope of this paper by 
adding welfare analysis.  Since we assume that the winner of the patent is a perfectly 
discriminating monopolist, a joint monopoly is socially optimal because it prevents value 
dissipating investments.  If the winner of the patent is not a perfectly discriminating monopolist, 
then patent races can enhance social welfare by allowing consumers to access new technologies 
earlier.18   
Another expansion of this paper is to consider technological spillovers.  While 
competition motivates a firm to invest, technological spillovers will motivate a firm to withhold 
investments so as to free ride on investment efforts of its rival.  It is worthwhile to study a firm’s 
investment behavior and other financial properties in a competitive environment with the 
presence of technological spillovers.   
 
APPENDIX A.  The Derivation of the Bellman Equation of Firm A 
    To evaluate the firms, we assume that the non-diversifiable risk in the patent value x  can be 
hedged by trading the market portfolio.  With this assumption, we can price the firms without 
knowing investors’ risk preference or the true growth rate µ  of the patent value, as in Black-
Scholes.  Construct a hedge portfolio: buy firm A, which is worth AF , and sell short An  units of 
the market portfolio.  The value of a share in the market portfolio with dividends reinvested is mP .  
The hedging demand An  will be chosen so that the non-diversifiable risk of this portfolio is 
eliminated.  The value of this portfolio is A A mQ F n P= − .  The total return on this portfolio over 
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interval dt  is A AA mdF n dP I dt− − .  By applying Ito’s lemma and assuming that 
Adz  and 
Bdz are mutually independent, and are both independent of dw :  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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Note that we can decompose dw  into m Im xdw dz dz
σ σβ
σ σ
= + .  Hence, the total return on this 
portfolio over interval dt  is 
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β= .  In doing so, the only risk associated with this portfolio is diversifiable, and 
therefore the expected rate of return on the portfolio must equal to the risk-free rate fr .  That is, 







β=  into this 
equation, and re-grouping, the Bellman equation of firm A is: 
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APPENDIX B.  The Derivation of Firm Beta, Return Volatility and Return Covariance 
Beta of firm i: 
From Ito’s lemma, the return of firm i, ,i A B= : 
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Since the patent value follows geometric Brownian motion dx xdt xdwµ σ= +  and the dividend 
yield is δ .  The return on the patent is  
( )
( )








+⎛ ⎞⇒ = +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
And by assumption, the market return ( )mm f m m m
m
dPR r dt dz
P
λ σ= = + +  is normally distributed 
with mean ( )f mr dtλ+  and variance 2mdtσ . 





















⎡ ⎤⎛ + + ⎞⎛ ⎞+⎛ ⎞












   










dF I dt dF I dtdF I dt E E R E RCov R F FF
Var R dt
FE x dw dz







⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− −⎛ ⎞−
− −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦
= =
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎛ ⎞⎣ ⎦








ε =  is the elasticity of firm i’s value with respect to the patent value. 
 
The return volatility of firm i over interval dt , ,i A B= : 
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The covariance of the two firms’ returns over interval dt : 
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1 The available databases are VentureXpert provided by Venture Economics and VentureSource provided 
by VentureOne. 
2 The results are robust to explicit finite difference method. 
3 Empirically, we can proxy joint monopoly by start-ups that work on the similar technology and controlled 
by the same venture capitalist and proxy competing firms in a patent race by start-ups that work on the 
similar technology and controlled by different venture capitalists. 
4 “Options, Futures, & Other Derivatives,” 4th edition, by John Hull, p.g. 241. 
5 For an excellent review of this subject, please see the books by Dixit and Pindyck [1994] and Trigeorgis 
[1996]. 
6 Schwartz and Moon [2000], Schwartz [2002] and Berk, Green and Naik [2004] consider the possibility 
that an exogenously catastrophic event may put an end to the firm.   
7 Grenadier [2000] does a good survey on this literature. 
8 The model and solution can be easily extended to an oligopolistic case involving a finite number of firms. 
9  The general process of expected cost-to-completion in Pindyck [1993], allowing both technological 
uncertainty and input cost uncertainty, is ( )Idk Idt k dz
k
φθ= − + , 10
2
φ≤ ≤ .  The case of φ =0 corresponds 
to input cost uncertainty.  The version we use corresponds to 1
2
φ = . 
10  This can be justified by business news.  For example, the 64-bit Intel super chip “Itanium” was initially 
to be released in 1997.  However, a long series of delays pushed the chip’s release date all the way into the 
first half of 2001. 
11 Kyle and Meng [2003] relax this assumption studying strategic acquisition and investment decisions, in 
which a firm with larger research bandwidth acquires a firm with smaller bandwidth. 
12 The Markovian strategies imply that firms cannot engage in history-dependent punishment strategies, 
which would support a more collusive equilibrium.  It tends to support an equilibrium in which there is 
more rent dissipation than under alternative equilibrium concepts where firms behave more co-operatively.  
How much this issue of equilibrium concept matters is an issue for further research. 
13 The scenario that both firms have dominant strategies happens at more than 99% of the decision nodes in 
the numerical implementation. 
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14 Theoretically, we assume that firms get nothing if neither of them has won by time T.  But, in the 
numerical implementation, we replace this assumption with a set of liquidation values designed to 
approximate in an ad hoc manner what might happen if the game were to continue.  Specifically, we first 
calculate the expected profits of both firms under the assumption that the firm is a monopolist and there is 
no more volatility in either the patent value or the cost-to-completion.  If one of the firms has a positive  
NPV and the other a negative NPV, then the positive NPV firm is assigned a liquidation value equal to its 
NPV and the negative NPV firm is assigned a liquidation value of zero.  If both firms have a negative NPV 
value, both firms get zero.  If both firms have a positive NPV value, we give each firm its NPV value 
multiplied by the ratio of the other firm’s expected time-to-completion divided by the sum of both firms’ 
expected time-to-completion, i.e., we make the “probability” of winning the NPV value inversely 
proportional to the expected time-to-completion.  The ratio of the expected time-to-completion is the same 
as the ratio of the expected cost-to-completion because the two firms have the same maximum investment 
rate.  We do not believe that this approximation has an economically significant effect on the results. 
15  Based on the data source of PricewaterhouseCooper/Venture Economics/NVCA MoneyTree Survey, 
venture capital investment in United States companies decreased sharply after the bubble burst, from about 
28.75 billion dollars in the first quarter of 2000 to about 4 billion dollars in the first quarter of 2003. 
16 Graphs of the comparative-static analysis are omitted.  They are available upon request.   
17 Hartman [1972] and Abel [1983,1984,1985], etc., find a positive relationship between investment and 
market demand uncertainty by predicting that the marginal revenue product of capital is convex of market 
demand shock.  Pindyck [1988], Bertola [1988], and Caballero and Pindyck [1996], etc., studying models 
with irreversible investments, instead find a negative relationship by predicting concave marginal revenue 
product of capital.  Roger Craine [1988], emphasizing the covariance of a firm’s return with market return, 
also point to a negative relationship.  Kulatilaka and Perotti [1998] and Kogan [2001] find the relationship 
ambiguous.  The empirical work testing this relationship is limited.  One exception is Leahy and Whited 
[1996].  It uses the volatility in stock market returns as a measure of uncertainty and favors the theory with 
irreversible investments that investment is negatively correlated with uncertainty through Tobin’s q.  It 
does not control for firm position relative to competitors.  Further empirical research is worth doing. 
18 Miltersen and Schwartz [2004], Moscarini and Squintani [2004] and Kyle and Meng [2004] are good 






Figure 1: Investment Strategies of Firms A and B in the Case of Joint Monopoly given  
                the Patent Value x(t)=100.  
                The horizontal axis is firm A’s cost-to-completion. The vertical axis is B’s  
                cost-to-completion. The light gray (orange) area is where firm A invests and  
                firm B does not. The dark (blue) area is where firm B invests and firm A does  











Joint Monopoly given x=100


































Figure 2: Investment Strategies of Firm A in the Patent Race given the Patent Value  
                x(t)=100.  
                The horizontal axis is firm A’s cost-to-completion. The vertical axis is firm B’s  
                cost-to-completion. The light gray (yellow) area shows where firm A invests.  










Investment Strategies of Firm A in a Duopoly Patent Race given x=100


































Figure 3: Investment Strategies of Firms A and B in the Patent Race given the Patent  
                Value x(t)=100.  
                The horizontal axis is firm A’s cost-to-completion. The vertical axis is firm B’s  
 cost-to-completion. The light gray (yellow) area shows where firm A invests  
 and firm B does not. The dark (blue) area shows where firm B invests and firm  
 A does not. The medium gray (green) area shows where both firms invest. The  














































Figure 4: Investment Strategies of Firms A and B in the Patent Race given the Patent  
                Value x(t)=151.  
                The horizontal axis is firm A’s cost-to-completion. The vertical axis is firm B’s  
 cost-to-completion. The light gray (yellow) area shows where firm A invests  
 and firm B does not. The dark (blue) area shows where firm B invests and firm  
 A does not. The medium gray (green) area shows where both firms invest. The  












































Figure 5: Iso-Value Lines for the Joint Monopoly given the Patent Value x(t)=100. 
                The horizontal axis is firm A’s cost-to-completion. The vertical axis is firm  
                B’s cost-to-completion. The dotted-curves are the contour plot of the joint  





























































Figure 6: Iso-Value Lines for Firms A and B in the Patent Race given the Patent Value  
                x(t)=100. 
                The horizontal axis is firm A’s cost-to-completion. The vertical axis is firm  
 B’s cost-to-completion. The dotted-curves are the contour plot of the firms’  
 investment regions. The intervals between the iso-value lines represent factors  




























































Figure 7: Iso-Value Lines for the Portfolio Comprising Firms A and B in the Patent Race  
                given the Patent Value x(t)=100. 
                The horizontal axis is firm A’s cost-to-completion. The vertical axis is firm  
 B’s cost-to-completion. The dotted-curves are the contour plot of the  





























































Figure 8: Level Curves for the Percentage Value Dissipation given the Patent Value  
                x(t)=100. 
                Expected rent dissipation is measured as the percentage difference between the  
                combined values of the two firms under the joint monopoly and the duopoly  
                patent race.  
                The horizontal axis is firm A’s cost-to-completion. The vertical axis is firm B’s  
                cost-to-completion. The dotted-curves are the contour plot of firms’ investment  

























































Figure 9: Level Curves for CAPM Beta of the Joint Monopoly given the Patent Value  
                x(t)=100. 
                The horizontal axis is firm A’s cost-to-completion. The vertical axis is firm B’s  
                cost-to-completion. The dotted-curves are the contour plot of the joint  





















































Figure 10: Level Curves for CAPM Beta of Firm A in the Patent Race given the Patent  
                  Value x(t)=100. 
                  The horizontal axis is firm A’s cost-to-completion. The vertical axis is firm         
                  B’s cost-to-completion. The dotted-curves are the contour plot of the  










































































Figure 11: Level Curves for CAPM Beta of the Portfolio Comprising Firms A and B in  
                  the Patent Race given the Patent Value x(t)=100. 
                  The horizontal axis is firm A’s cost-to-completion. The vertical axis is firm         
                  B’s cost-to-completion. The dotted-curves are the contour plot of the  































































Figure 12: Level Curves for Annualized Return Volatility of the Joint Monopoly given  
                  the Patent Value x(t)=100. 
                  The horizontal axis is firm A’s cost-to-completion. The vertical axis is firm         
                  B’s cost-to-completion. The dotted-curves are the contour plot of the joint  




















































Figure 13: Level Curves for Annualized Return Volatility of Firm A in the Patent Race  
                  given the Patent Value x(t)=100. 
                  The horizontal axis is firm A’s cost-to-completion. The vertical axis is firm         
                  B’s cost-to-completion. The dotted-curves are the contour plot of the  







































































Figure 14: Level Curves for Fraction of Return Volatility of Firm A Caused by Its  
                  Idiosyncratic Risk given the Patent Value x(t)=100. 
                  The horizontal axis is firm A’s cost-to-completion. The vertical axis is firm         
                  B’s cost-to-completion. The dotted-curves are the contour plot of the  
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Figure 15: Level Curves for Annualized Return Volatility of the Portfolio Comprising  
                   Firms A and B in the patent Race given the Patent Value x(t)=100. 
                   The horizontal axis is firm A’s cost-to-completion. The vertical axis is firm         
                   B’s cost-to-completion. The dotted-curves are the contour plot of the  





























































Figure 16: Level Curves for Percentage Difference of Annualized Return Volatility  
                   between the Portfolio Comprising Firms A and B in the patent Race and  
                   the Joint Monopoly given the Patent Value x(t)=100. 
                   The horizontal axis is firm A’s cost-to-completion. The vertical axis is firm         
                   B’s cost-to-completion. The dotted-curves are the contour plot of the  


























































Figure 17: Level Curves for Return Correlation between the Firms A and B in the Patent  
                  Race given Patent Value x(t)=100. 
                  The horizontal axis is firm A’s cost-to-completion. The vertical axis is firm         
                  B’s cost-to-completion. The dotted-curves are the contour plot of the  
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